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Abstract
This paper studies expectations formation and forecasting of vehicle demand in Singapore under the
vehicle quota system. Under the system, a car buyer must ﬁrst bid for a vehicle license in monthly auctions
in order to purchase a new car. We construct an econometric model to test the hypothesis that past bid
distributions of the license auctions contain information that car buyers can use to update their expecta-
tions about the intensity of market demand, forecast license premiums and formulate their bidding strat-
egies in future auctions. Our empirical analysis indicates that past bid distributions have a good degree
of predictive power for the vehicle license premiums.
 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
JEL classiﬁcation: D44
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1. Introduction
Auctions are used in the allocation of a wide variety of goods and services, including treasury
bills, art and antiques, oil drill leases, ﬁshing rights, houses, agricultural produce, radio spectrum
and 3G mobile phone licenses. In the case of Singapore, monthly auctions of quota licenses have
been conducted since May 1990 to allocate the rights to own motor vehicles. Governments also
frequently procure supplies and services through tenders and award contracts to the lowest-cost
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bidder. Most auctions are also not one-oﬀ aﬀairs. In fact, like the vehicle quota license auctions in
Singapore, many auctions take place regularly and involve the sale of multiple units of the same
object. Other examples of repeated auctions with multiple units of identical or closely substitut-
able objects are auctions of ﬂowers (e.g. in The Netherlands), wine auctions (e.g. in France and
California, USA), auctions of real estate properties (e.g. New Zealand) as well as Treasury bills
(e.g. in USA) and initial public oﬀerings (e.g. Taiwan). Many participants in these auctions
interact repeatedly, and new players may enter the auctions while other players leave.
In all these auctions, bidders must form expectations about the market demand for the objects
to be allocated, the consequent competition that they will face in the auction, as well as forecast
the winning bids. Although the underlying economic conditions ﬂuctuate over time and the set of
participants in each auction may vary, participants in these repeated auctions can often gather
useful information from the bid distributions and winning bids of preceding auctions. Based on
this information, they will update their beliefs about current and future market demands, the
competition they face, as well as revise their expectations about the valuation of the objects to
be allocated.
A rich theoretical literature on auctions, developed since the 1980s (see Klemperer (1999) for a
recent survey), had furthered our knowledge of the optimal design of auctions, the properties of
diﬀerent auction formats and their welfare implications, the strategic interactions between auction
participants and the optimal bidding strategies they will use to compete eﬀectively. In particular,
Milgrom and Weber (1982) has shown that when bidders valuations are aﬃliated, 1 it is in the
interest of the seller to make available as much relevant information as possible before each
auction, as this is likely to raise expected proceeds from the auction, as bidders utilize the
information optimally in formulating their expectations.
In the context of repeated aﬃliated-value auctions such as Singapores vehicle license auction,
the bid distributions of previous auctions contain useful information about bidders expectations
about market demands and trends. This information could still be relevant in future license
auctions, particularly if they point to a trend in the demand for new vehicles. While the theory
behind aﬃliated-value auctions is well established, and experimental research have illuminated the
strategic aspects of these type of auctions and the ‘‘winners curse’’ phenomenon (see for instance,
Hendricks and Paarsch, 1995; Kagel and Levin, 1986; Levin et al., 1996), there have been few
empirical studies on the expectation formation process and the use of past bid distributions in
forecasting market demand and the market-clearing bids. This provides the motivation for this
paper, which aims to study the expectations formation process and the forecasting of vehicle
demand under Singapores vehicle quota license auction, which is an example a repeated multiple-
object uniform price auction with a second-price bidding format.
Our objective in this paper is to study how car buyers, or more commonly, distributors acting
on behalf of car buyers, bid for vehicle licenses and whether it is possible to forecast vehicle license
premiums (i.e. the lowest successful bids) with good accuracy and improve ones success of
securing a vehicle license. To our knowledge, the present study is the only one of its kind in
forecasting vehicle demand in the setting of a quota license auction.
1 Roughly speaking, bidders private information or signals are aﬃliated if a high value of one bidders signal makes
high values of other bidders signals more likely.
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Our study focuses on the period from September 1994 to December 1997 (altogether 40 auc-
tions), when data on the bid distributions for the sealed-bid auction format was available. The
sealed-bid auction format in Singapore vehicle license auction oﬀers us a unique opportunity to
study the expectations formation and demand-forecasting game as participants in the repeated
auctions use bid distributions of previous auctions to update their valuations and predict future
license premiums. 2
Under the current online-open bid format (since May 2002), each license auction takes place
over three days at the beginning and middle of each calendar month, and bidders can see, in real
time, the market-clearing bids at each point in time before the auction closes. Bidders can update
their valuations in real time, enter or drop out of the auction, or revise their bids. However,
bidders with valuations lower than the market-clearing bids will not enter the license auction.
Thus, the bid distributions for an open auction format are necessarily truncated distributions
since they do not capture the data from the participants who did not enter the auction. Under-
standing the expectations formation and demand-forecasting process in the open-bidding auction
is a much more challenging task.
Our analysis is as follows. We construct an econometric model to test the hypothesis that in
Singapores vehicle license auction, past bid distributions contain signiﬁcant information that
bidders can use to revise their expectations about the intensity of market demand (as measured by
the ratio of available monthly quota over the number of bidders participating in the auction),
forecast the quota license premiums and formulate their bidding strategies. The results of our
econometric analysis support this hypothesis. Speciﬁcally, we found that, collectively, the mean,
variance of past bid distributions, as well as the ratio of the license quota over the number of
submitted bids, have a good degree of predictive power for vehicle license premiums.
The plan for the rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief description of the
main features of Singapores vehicle quota system. In Section 3, we discuss the main elements of
game-theoretic modeling of the vehicle quota license auction. This forms the basis for the con-
struction of an econometric model in Section 4 to study the expectations formation and demand-
forecasting process in the vehicle license auction. While our econometric model is applied to the
vehicle license auctions in Singapore, the methodology of our model is broadly applicable to
auctions of other types of goods in a sealed-bid format. We conclude our study in Section 5 with
a discussion and comments on future research.
2. Singapore’s vehicle quota system
The vehicle quota system (‘‘VQS’’) was implemented in May 1990 to complement existing ﬁscal
tax measures to control the growth in vehicle population. Under the VQS, each car buyer must
ﬁrst bid for a vehicle quota license––oﬃcially referred to as the Certiﬁcate of Entitlement (or more
commonly, COE). Each quota license allows a vehicle to be on the road for ten years. At the end
of this period, the owner may either de-register the vehicle or renew the license for a further 5-year
2 Although data from January 1998 to June 2001 are available, we have chosen not to include them in the study,
for reasons that we discuss in Section 4.
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or 10-year period, by paying a ‘‘prevailing quota license premium’’. Over the past decade, there
have been a number of studies that assessed the mechanics, equity and eﬃciency of the VQS
(among them, Phang, 1993; Koh and Lee, 1994; Chin and Smith, 1997; Chu, 1998, 2002; Chu and
Goh, 1997; Toh and Phang, 1997; Tan, 2001; Koh, 2003).
Until June 2001, the allocation of vehicle quotas licenses was conducted via a sealed-bid
auction where successful bidders pay the lowest successful bid. 3 Following a government review
of the VQS, the auction format switched to an online open-bid format in several phases, beginning
in June 2001. Since May 2002, there are two auctions conducted twice a month (the beginning and
the middle of the month). The bidding is carried out online, at the website of the Land Transport
Authority of Singapore (‘‘LTA’’), at http://www.lta.gov.sg.
Every quota year (beginning in May), the quota for new motor vehicles is determined in
accordance with a targeted rate of growth in the motor vehicle population, and taking into ac-
count the projected de-registration of vehicles. At present, the LTA releases on its website the
exact calculations for the target vehicle population and the number of vehicle quota licenses
available for auction each month. The projected quota for each category is allocated almost
equally over 12 months.
Motor vehicles are classiﬁed into several categories under the VQS, with a separate license
quota for each category. Prior to 1999, there were seven quota categories. 4 To allow changes in
consumer tastes to inﬂuence the composition of the vehicle population over time, 25% of the de-
registered vehicles in each category are allotted to an ‘‘Open’’ category, where the quota licenses
can be used to register motor vehicles belonging to any of the quota categories. ‘‘Open’’ category
licenses are transferable once. Beginning in July 2001, bidding for quota licenses shifted gradually
from a sealed-bid format to an on-line open-bid format.
In each quota license auction, each bidder is allowed to submit only one bid in only one cat-
egory, and must furnish a deposit equal to half the bid amount. Successful bidders pay the lowest
winning bid, and must pay the diﬀerence between the winning bid and their deposit at the time of
the registration of the vehicle. Although the license auctions are oversubscribed (with one
exception, to be discussed in Section 4.1), not all the quota licenses are allocated in each auction.
This is because there is no tie-breaking procedure for identical bids at the cutoﬀ level. These bids
are treated as unsuccessful bids, and the license premium for the auction is the next higher bid.
The unallocated licenses are carried over to the next monthly auction in the same category.
As originally conceived, each car buyer is supposed to bid for a quota license directly and then
places an order for a car when a license is obtained. In practice, it is the car distributors that bid
for the licenses on behalf of car buyers, since car distributors typically oﬀer bundled packages
3 When there are many participants in the auctions, the distribution of bids is approximately continuous, so that the
lowest successful bid will be close to the highest rejected bid. Hence, the vehicle quota license auction is approximately a
second-price auction format.
4 When the VQS was ﬁrst introduced in 1990, there were seven categories; these are: Category 1 for cars of 1000 cc
and below; Category 2 for cars of 1001–1600 cc and below, and taxis; Category 3 for cars of 1601–2000 cc and below;
Category 4 for cars above 2000 cc; Category 5 for goods vehicles and buses; Category 6 for motorcycles; Category 7, an
‘‘Open’’ category for registration of all types of vehicles. An eighth category for ‘‘weekend cars’’ was introduced in May
1991, but discontinued in September 1994. In May 1999, Categories 1 and 2 were merged into one category, as was the
case for Categories 3 and 4. The other categories were unchanged.
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where the quoted car price already includes a ‘‘subsidized’’ quota license, sometimes with pro-
visions to raise the car price if there are substantial ﬂuctuations in the license premiums. These
pricing policies discriminate against buyers who obtain quota licenses on their own, rather than
through the distributors. In fact, some car distributors would not entertain car buyers who
attempt to bid and obtain quota licenses on their own.
3. Modeling the vehicle license auction
To provide the setting for the econometric model we shall use in this study, we ﬁrst discuss the
main elements of game-theoretic models of the vehicle license auctions. 5 The vehicle license
auction is an example of an aﬃliated-values repeated multiple-object auction (for a precise def-
inition of aﬃliated values, see Milgrom and Weber, 1982). Therefore, the valuations of bidders
and the sealed bids that they submit have a common-value element. The participants in these
auctions form expectations about the intensity of demand in each auction. The objective is to
submit bids higher than the forecast quota license premiums.
Consider the demand problem from the perspective of car distributors. We note that in
practice, car distributors typically act on behalf of car buyers to bid for quota licenses. As car
distributors share a common objective to generate sales while minimizing cost of operations
(particularly if they had to oﬀer bundled packages with ‘‘guaranteed’’ quota licenses), their val-
uations of the quota licenses––and the bids they submit as a result––will be aﬀected by each
others expectations. More generally, for all bidders in the license auction, their valuations of
licenses will be inﬂuenced by the intensity of market demand in the current auction, as well as by
the anticipated demands in future auctions. Finally, to the extent that car buyers can choose the
timing of their car purchases, the quota licenses in diﬀerent auctions are substitutable; hence,
bidders valuations and their resultant demands in each license auction would be inﬂuenced by the
license premiums in earlier auctions. Since bidders also have the option not to participate in the
current auction but in future auctions, their valuations in the current auction will be aﬀected by
their expectations and forecasts of future license premiums, as well as their beliefs regarding the
expectations of rival bidders concerning future market demands. Finally, the beliefs and forecasts
of the auction participants may be based on both public and private information.
In summary, each bidder will possess private information that inﬂuences his expectations of
market demand and his valuation of the vehicle licenses. He may also acquire additional infor-
mation, as well as use the relevant public information to revise his valuations and formulate his
bidding strategy. Speciﬁcally, for the prospective car buyer, the private information will include
the stream of utilities he can derive from owning and using a passenger car. He may also have
some private information regarding future car demand. For the company executive, his private
5 Formal game-theoretic models of Singapores vehicle quota license auctions can be found in Koh and Lee (1994),
Tan (2001) and Koh (2003). Each of these studies focuses on a diﬀerent aspect of the vehicle quota license auction, and
formulates diﬀerent models to address the issues. In particular, Koh (2003) constructed a model to study the impact
of the vehicle quota system on the market competition in the car distributorship industry.
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information will include the vehicles contribution to the companys business operations, as well as
his expectations of future demand for licenses, etc. For car distributors, the private information
that aﬀects their valuations would include the companies proﬁt margins, the competitions car
pricing policies, and forecasts of future car demand. For a speculator who bids in the ‘‘Open’’
category, and who is only interested in reselling the quota license in the secondary market, the
private information would include the level of demand for ‘‘Open’’ category transferable licenses
as well as his forecasts of secondary market prices. Finally, if a bidder decides to bid for a non-
transferable quota license in a speciﬁc category, rather than buy a transferable (‘‘Open’’ category)
license, the bidders private information would include his forecast about the license premiums
in the resale market for Open category licenses.
Besides private information, auction participants have access to public information (e.g. news
reports about economic outlook, announcements of changes in government policies, etc.) that
may also aﬀect their expectations about market demand and valuations of the licenses. For in-
stance, the number of quota licenses available in each auction is public knowledge, since this is
determined a year in advance and made public on the website of the LTA. Changes in future
license quotas will lead to revision in the expectations of future quota premiums, and this will
aﬀect bidders decision to participate in a particular auction––either postponing participation or
bringing forward the participation. Auction participants can also evaluate the bid distributions of
previous auctions, which are made available by the LTA, to learn about the valuations of other
bidders. Such ex post public information regarding competition in the license auctions may
provide useful information about the competition in subsequent auctions, particularly if it points
to a market trend. Another piece of public information that may be relevant is the price of
‘‘Open’’ category quota licenses in the secondary market.
Conditional on the public information and their private information, each bidder forms
expectations about the intensity of demand, calculates his valuations for the quota licenses in the
current auction, and formulates his bidding strategies accordingly. It is well-established in auction
theory that Nash equilibrium bidding strategies exist for auction games with aﬃliated valuations:
each players optimal strategy is to bid as if as he is the marginal successful bidder (see, for in-
stance, Milgrom and Weber, 1982; Koh and Lee, 1994; Klemperer, 1999), based on his beliefs and
expectations of market demand. For our study, the practical implication of the Nash equilibrium
bidding strategy in Singapores market for new motor vehicles is that bidders in the vehicle license
auction will try to forecast the winning bid and bid higher than the forecast bid. Furthermore,
bidders will optimally use the information contained in previous bid distributions to form their
expectations about car demand and the degree of competition in the current auction (speciﬁcally,
the number of bidders, as well as the expected value of the rivals bids) in order to forecast the
license premium (i.e. the lowest successful bid).
4. Econometric analysis
In this section, we present an econometric model to study the expectations formation and
demand-forecasting process in Singapores vehicle license auctions. In particular, we seek to
understand whether it is possible to forecast the intensity of market demand as well as the quota
license premiums in each auction, utilizing the information contained in previous license auctions.
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If there are signiﬁcant learning eﬀects, the informational content of bid distributions will have a
high degree of predictive power for future car demands and the quota license premiums.
The following notations will be used in our econometric model: Pt ¼ quota license premium (i.e.
the lowest successful bid), Qt ¼ available licenses in the quota, and Bt ¼ number of bids submitted.
For a randomly selected participant in the license auction (which, in our sample, was conducted
on a monthly basis), we denote his bid by ePt. Since each bidder cannot observe the bids of other
participants in the sealed-bid auction, each bidder may consider his bid ePt as a random variable
with mean lt and variance r
2
t . We allow lt and variance r
2
t to vary over time, in order to reﬂect
changes in the bidding strategies of existing participants (say, in response to new public infor-
mation or new private information) or the participation of new bidders in the license auctions,
as well as changing demand conditions.
As the number of successful bids is ﬁxed at Qt, the available monthly quota, we deﬁne
Rt ¼ Qt=Bt as the quota–bid ratio. This measures the market demand for vehicles and the resultant
degree of competition in the current auction. Fig. 1 shows the inverse of the quota–bid ratio (i.e.
1=Rt ¼ Bt=Qt) for the four passenger car categories (Categories 1–4) and the open category
(Category 7). It is clear from Fig. 1 that the bid–quota ratios are volatile, and appear to be
correlated across diﬀerent categories. Also, the bid–quota ratios are generally above 100%,
indicating oversubscription in the license auctions.
By construction, the probability of successfully obtaining a vehicle license is given by
PrðePt P PtÞ ¼ QtBt ¼ Rt ð1Þ
For our analysis, we shall assume that the standardized bid, ðePt  ltÞ=rt, has a distribution
function F ðÞ. Therefore, we obtain the following relationship:
PrðePt < PtÞ ¼ Pr ePt  ltrt
 
<
Pt  lt
rt
!
¼ F Pt  lt
rt
 
¼ 1 Rt ð2Þ
Taking the inverse transformation, we obtain
Pt  lt
rt
¼ F 1ð1 RtÞ ð3Þ
so that
Pt ¼ lt þ rtF 1ð1 RtÞ ð4Þ
The expression in (4) shows that the market-clearing quota license premium depends on (i) the
mean lt and variance r
2
t of the distribution of the submitted bids, (ii) the distribution function
F ðÞ, and ﬁnally (iii) the quota–bid ratio Rt, which reﬂects the intensity of market demand in each
quota license auction.
As the various quantities in the econometric model are not observable ex ante, our approach is
to use proxies in its empirical estimation. Firstly, we approximate F 1ðÞ by a low-order poly-
nomial. For our purpose, it suﬃces to approximate F 1ð1 RtÞ by a quadratic function in Rt. 6
6 Note that this approximation is local to the sample data that we consider in our study.
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Secondly, we use Rt1 as the proxy for Rt. This is in line with our theoretical hypothesis that
bidders would use the bid distributions of previous auctions in formulating their expectations and
beliefs in future auctions. Thirdly, we assume that the mean lt of the bid distribution in the
current auction is the quota license premium in the preceding auction, i.e., lt ¼ Pt1. This is a
0
May-90 Sep-91 Jan-93 Jun-94 Oct-95 Mar-97 Jul-98 Dec-99
0
May-90 Sep-91 Jan-93 Jun-94 Oct-95 Mar-97 Jul-98 Dec-99
0
1000
1200
May-90 Sep-91 Jan-93 Jun-94 Oct-95 Mar-97 Jul-98 Dec-99
0
1000
May-90 Sep-91 Jan-93 Jun-94 Oct-95 Mar-97 Jul-98 Dec-99
0
May-90 Sep-91 Jan-93 Jun-94 Oct-95 Mar-97 Jul-98 Dec-99
0
100100
200200
300
300
400
400
500
500
600
600 700
800
May-90 Sep-91 Jan-93 Jun-94 Oct-95 Mar-97 Jul-98 Dec-99
Average Bid/Quota RatioCategory 7   Bid/Quota Ratio
Category 3   Bid/Quota Ratio
Category 1   Bid/Quota Ratio Category 2   Bid/Quota Ratio
Category 4   Bid/Quota Ratio
700
400
200
400
100
200
200
300
400
500
600
600
600
100
200
300
400
500
600
700
800
800
Fig. 1. Bid–quota ratios: May 1990 to April 1999. Note: the average bid/quota ratio is the average for Categories 1–4
and 7.
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practical assumption and corresponds to the situation where each bidder believes that expected
value of the rivals submitted bids is the quota license premium of the preceding auction. 7 Finally,
we use the moving average of the standard deviation of the bid distributions of the three preceding
auctions, denoted by rt1 ¼ ðrt1 þ rt2 þ rt3Þ=3, as the proxy for rt. The choice of rt1 is to
smooth out the eﬀect of ﬂuctuations in the bid distributions caused by the participation of
speculators who submit random bids to try their luck and other short-term market perturba-
tions. 8
With these assumptions and proxy measures in mind for the estimation process, we will
consider the following regression equation 9
Pt  Pt1 ¼ b0 þ b1rt1Rt1 þ b2rt1R2t1 ð5Þ
Thus, we obtain an econometric model with the ﬁrst-order price diﬀerences ðPt  Pt1Þ as the
dependent variable.
Our preliminary data analysis indicates that the data series of the quota license premiums Pt for
all the quota license categories possess a unit root and are therefore non-stationary. The non-
stationary property of Pt is not surprising, since the vehicle quota system has undergone diﬀerent
policy changes and the underlying economic environments have also changed signiﬁcantly be-
tween May 1990 and December 1997. By contrast, we have found that the data series of the price
diﬀerences ðPt  Pt1Þ are stationary. (The details will be given in Section 4.2.) Hence, for the
purpose of uncovering the learning and expectations formation processes in the quota license
auctions, our approach of modeling the price diﬀerence of the license is appropriate.
4.1. Auction data
For our study, data on license premiums, the monthly quota, the number of submitted bids,
from May 1990 onwards, were obtained from LTAs website (at http://www.lta.gov.sg). However,
data on bid distributions in the sealed-bid license auctions were available only from September
1994 to June 2001 (when the auction format switched to an online open-bidding format). This
information was previously disseminated primarily to car distributors and the motoring associ-
ations (such as the Automobile Association of Singapore and the Motor Traders Association
of Singapore), and is not available on LTAs website.
Unfortunately, the bid distribution data that was disseminated were not individual bids, but
bids grouped and summarized into bands of price relatives above and below the market-clearing
bids (see Fig. 2 for a sample of the bid distributions). Thus, the bid distribution data are somewhat
less informative that what we would have liked. Nonetheless, the available information suﬃces
for our purpose of calculating the means and standard deviations in the license auctions.
7 For Categories 1 and 7, which we will discuss in Section 4.2, the correlations between lt and Pt1 are 0.93 and 0.91,
respectively. Thus, this assumption is justiﬁed statistically.
8 Other moving-average orders have been considered in the empirical analysis. The three-month moving average,
however, provides the best results for the regression analysis.
9 Note that an explanatory variable rt1 may be included in the regression due to the constant term in the quadratic
approximation of F 1ðÞ. However, the variable rt1 has been found to be statistically insigniﬁcant, due the presence of
multicollinearity, and is therefore excluded in the regression analysis.
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Our study focuses on the period from September 1994 to December 1997 (altogether 40 auc-
tions). While bid distribution data from January 1998 to June 2001 are available, we have elected
not to use these data for the following reasons. From January 1998 onwards, our preliminary data
analysis uncovered the persistent presence of lottery seekers (to be deﬁned shortly) in all the
categories of the quota license auctions. 10 This occurred after the January 1998 license auction
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Fig. 2. An illustration of the bid distribution in Singapores vehicle quota auction Category 7, March 1995. Notes: (1)
The range of bid amounts is in increment/decrement of 10% from the quota premium (S$45,002). (2) The original source
of the data is the Land Transport Authority of Singapore. The data is no longer available on its website.
10 By lottery seekers, we refer to participants in the quota license auctions who submit bids that are unrealistically
low, in the hope that if the auction is undersubscribed (i.e. fewer bidders than available licenses), they may be able to
pick up a license at a bargain.
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for Category 3. In that auction, there were only 315 bids for 336 available licenses. The resulting
quota license premium was S$50 (the lowest ever), and this was the only time that the quota li-
cense auction was ever undersubscribed.
The sharp drop in market demand for cars and the consequent undersubscription in the Jan-
uary 1998 Category 3 auction had to do with the events of December 1997. Then, South Korea
almost defaulted on its sovereign debt, as foreign capital retreated from Asian economies fol-
lowing the currency devaluations in Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines during the Asian
Financial Crisis. Although the International Monetary Fund pulled together a rescue debt-
restructuring package over Christmas of 1997 to stave oﬀ a potential sovereign debt default,
consumer sentiment took a sharp dive across Asian economies. In Singapore, the sharp decline
in consumer sentiment was the cause of the weaker participation in the quota license auctions
in January 1998.
The occurrence of the S$50 license premium in January 1998 contrasted with a peak of
S$95,000 (in November 1994) and prompted many lottery seekers to participate in the subsequent
quota license auctions and try their luck. 11 In turn, this led to the presence of a concentration of
bids at the lower end of the bid distribution. As is evident in Fig. 1, the bid–quota ratios for all the
passenger car categories shot up signiﬁcantly after January 1998, and persisted for many months
before subsidizing, but still remained above the levels of December 1997 and January 1998. Since
our objective in this paper is to study the formation of expectations in forecasting vehicle demand
where the auction participants are bona ﬁde car buyers (i.e. not lottery seekers), we restrict our
sample to the period before the December 1997 bidding.
4.2. Research ﬁndings
We apply the econometric model to all seven license categories for passenger cars, for the
period September 1994 through December 1997. To recapitulate, our hypothesis is that in Sin-
gapores vehicle quota license auction––an example of a repeated multiple-object auction where
the objects have a common value to the bidders––the bid distributions contain information for
bidders to update their expectations about the intensity of market demand (i.e. Rt the quota–bid
ratio), make forecasts about the vehicle license premiums and formulate their bidding strategies.
This hypothesis is supported by our econometric analysis, which shows that the bid distribu-
tions of previous license auctions have a good degree of predictive power for license premiums.
We found that the predictive power appears to be the strongest for Category 1 and the Category 7
(the ‘‘Open’’ category), and weaker for the other categories. In these two categories, we tallied a
total of 62,549 bids for the 29,622 licenses available over 40 auctions. Table 1 summarizes the
results of the econometric analysis for Categories 1 and 7.
The augmented Dickey–Fuller statistics show that Pt is non-stationary (as we discussed earlier),
while the ðPt  Pt1Þ series is stationary. 12 The regression slope parameters are all signiﬁcant at
11 Since the bidding format was a sealed-bid auction, bidders had no way of ﬁnding out that the January 1998
Category 3 auction was going to be undersubscribed. If they had known, more bids would have been submitted, or
lower bids would have been submitted.
12 See MacKinnon (1991) for the use of the augmented Dickey–Fuller test.
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the 5% level. Both regressions explain more than 30% of the variations in the quota license
premiums. For regressions based on price diﬀerences, the high R2 coeﬃcient is quite remarkable,
and supports our hypothesis that the bid distributions in the vehicle quota license auctions
contain signiﬁcant information for learning and expectations formation in subsequent auctions.
We believe that the stronger results for these two categories are due to the fact that there is little
substitution in demand for vehicles in these two categories, resulting in more stable distribution of
the bids ePt. Category 1 is for passenger cars of 1000 cc and below. Prospective car buyers in this
category are unlikely to switch to purchase a car in the other (more expensive) car categories if
quota license premiums increased (as was the case during most of the period from 1994 to 1997).
However, for Categories 2–4, prospective car buyers have the option to switch to a lower
(cheaper) car category if quota license premiums rose so much as to aﬀect their overall budget for
car purchase. In other words, there is a greater degree of substitutability in the other categories, so
that the bid distributions are less stable than in Category 1. In the case of Category 7, this is the
category for transferable licenses, and the bidders who participate in this category are the car
distributors. Thus, the set of participants are stable over time. Figs. 3 and 4 provide graphical
representations of the key features of the vehicle quota license auctions for Categories 1 and 7,
respectively.
From Table 1, we also note that the estimated values of b1 and b2 have opposite signs in the
regressions for Categories 1 and 7. Hence, the net eﬀect of Rt1 on the change in Pt is mixed. This
conclusion is, however, not surprising. First, an increase in Rt1 would lead to a decline in Pt1 (see
Eq. (4)), which has the eﬀect of encouraging more bidders to participate in the auction. 13 In other
words, Bt is likely to increase. As Bt increases, this causes Rt to decline and Pt to increase. Second,
when bidders form expectations for lt based on Pt1, an increase in Rt1 would reduce Pt1 and lt,
and hence Pt. As these two eﬀects of Rt1 on Pt are in opposite directions, the net eﬀect is uncertain.
Table 1
Estimation of the econometric model
Category
Cat 1: 1000 cc and below Cat 7: open, transferable
b0 11306.96 (3.609) )4734.939 ()1.071)
b1 )8.465 ()4.328) 3.451 (2.101)
b2 9.639 (4.357) )5.189 ()2.887)
R2 0.360 0.302
Durbin–Watson 2.200 1.977
ADF for Pt )1.9473 (0.3096) )2.2471 (0.1936)
ADF for Pt  Pt1 )7.1255 (0.0000) )4.3167 (0.0015)
No. of observations 37 37
Notes: ADF¼ augmented Dickey–Fuller statistic. The null hypothesis for the ADF test is that there is a unit root. For
the estimates of the parameters b, the ﬁgures in the parentheses are the t-ratios. For the ADF statistics, the ﬁgures in the
parentheses are the p-values.
13 The correlation between ðPt1  Pt2Þ and ðBt  Bt1Þ is )0.70 for Category 1 and )0.59 for Category 7.
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5. Summary and discussion
The objective of this paper is to study expectations formation and demand forecasting in
Singapores vehicle license auction. We construct an econometric model to demonstrate that in
Singapores vehicle license auction, participants can improve their chances of success by utilizing
the information in past auctions to formulate their bidding strategies. Speciﬁcally, we show that
the mean, variance and quota–bid ratios of preceding auctions have a signiﬁcant degree of pre-
dictive power for forecasting vehicle demand.
Although the data we used to calculate the means and standard deviations for our regression
analysis was partially aggregated data (as discussed in Section 4.1), the results––particularly for
Categories 1 and 7––support our hypothesis that past bid distributions contain useful information
about other bidders private information that may continue to be relevant in the current auction.
This is because in repeated multiple-object auctions, the objects being auctioned (in this case,
quota licenses) are substitutable across auctions, and therefore bidders should update their
expectations about the intensity of market demand in the current auction and revise their valu-
ations and bidding strategies accordingly.
The econometric model we describe in Section 4 is the simplest model for our analysis. It is
possible to reﬁne the analysis further to strengthen the results, but the qualitative conclusions
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Fig. 3. Vehicle quota license auction in Category 1.
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will remain unchanged. One promising avenue to reﬁne the model is to consider a simultaneous-
equation estimation setup. We noted in the discussion in Section 4.2 that number of bidders and
the lagged license premiums are negatively correlated. A more sophisticated means to incor-
porate this relationship and study its eﬀects on the regression model is to explicitly model
this process together with the demand-forecasting and price formation process described in
Section 4.
Finally, we believe that our econometric analysis is applicable to a wider setting. For in-
stance, in countries such as New Zealand and Singapore, real estate properties or land parcels
are sometimes sold via sealed-bid tenders, although the more commonly used format is an open-
bidding format. In the case of government procurement, however, sealed-bid tender is the
predominant format. Although these auctions are, strictly speaking, not repeated multiple-ob-
ject auctions, and the objects in one auction are not always perfectly substitutable with those in
subsequent auctions, they do share the same characteristics that the same set of players inter-
act repeatedly in successive auctions, and valuations are aﬃliated across bidders. Therefore,
it is likely that learning eﬀects are present in the price formation process of these other auc-
tions, as bidders seek to infer from past distributions the valuations of other players, the
private information they may possess, and then revise their own beliefs and expectations
accordingly.
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